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The new Coalition government came to power to find that their predecessors had bequeathed them a national defence strategy that was intellectually void; a military 
procurement policy paid for on the Micawber principle - that something would surely turn up, 
but measured in billions rather than sixpences; a bunch of generals on the verge of revolt; an 
unwinnable war in Afghanistan; a vision of Britain’s place and influence in the world based 
largely on wishful thinking; and a horrendous financial crisis. Given all that, their new National 
Security Strategy is not a bad piece of work. Of course the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review, the practical measures by which they propose to implement the strategy, is full of 
flaws and absurdities. Of course the Coalition, or at least its Tory component, is still gripped 
by illusion and by nostalgia for a vanished past when Britain could punch above its weight. 
But the government had to start somewhere, and they have at least taken a significant step 
towards devising a national defence posture suited to the twenty first century.
And so, for the first time, we have a national strategic concept which is not, as its predecessors 
were, simply a piecemeal scaling down of the ideas which we brought to the Cold War. It is no 
longer NATO-centric and based - despite many denials - on the idea that we needed to be capable of 
fighting a conventional war against a formidable conventional enemy (read Russia), and capable too 
of deterring - independently, all on our own - a nuclear enemy (read Russia or China or Iran). Instead 
the government has tried to think realistically about what constitute the real threats to Britain in a 
rapidly changing world, and come up with an orderly and reasonably plausible hierarchy - terrorism, 
cyber warfare and natural disaster. More money is rightly being given to the intelligence agencies and 
the special forces. There is a welcome recognition that diplomacy, and the much maligned Foreign 
Office, have an essential role in helping to shape a world where we are less vulnerable to violence. 
The aid budget has been refocussed, for the same reason, towards countries which spawn terrorism. 
The new strategy rightly recognises the distant but not impossible prospect of involvement in a war 
between states. But future forays abroad are to be undertaken only if they are legal and in the national 
interest: obvious criteria, one would have thought, but set aside in the days when we engaged in the 
heady and arrogant adventures of “liberal interventionism”. Painful but inescapable cuts have been 
made to the army, the navy, and the airforce. When they are complete we will no longer be able to 
mount a campaign on the scale of Iraq in 2003. Since that was a war we should never have fought 
in the first place, that is all to the good. 
This is all very satisfactory. A wholly sensible outcome was, of course, most unlikely. The course of the 
defence review was determined not by the imperatives of affordable national security, but by powerful 
political, industrial, emotional arguments which had little to do with our real needs, and often depended 
on historical analogy, a analytical tool of notorious unreliability. The military, with whom one may have 
much sympathy, and others who do not deserve it, argued disgracefully through leaks to the press 
that the task of government was to assure the security of the nation regardless, it sometimes seemed, 
of any financial reality. The airmen put a Spitfire in front of the Treasury to remind us of the Battle of 
Britain, and talked of fast jets and aerial dominance. The navy talked of securing our vital sea lanes, as 
if Admiral Mahan were still alive and we were still fighting the Battle of the Atlantic. Both seemed to 
think it was somehow unfair that cuts in the army should be postponed merely because the soldiers 
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were actually fighting a real war in Afghanistan. This 
relentless pressure was echoed by strong voices in 
the Conservative Party.
And so a number of sacred cows have remained 
unchallenged. Concessions to political reality - 
inevitable perhaps - have left us with armed forces 
still suffering from atrophy in some places and 
elephantiasis in others. The navy has got its two 
aircraft carriers, the largest ships in its history. The 
argument that we had to build unneeded aircraft 
carriers in order to retain the skills to build aircraft 
carriers we did not need does at least display a 
delightful circularity. But at least one of these 
great vessels is unlikely ever to ship any aircraft. 
Eventually they will no doubt be recognised as the 
white elephants they are. Like HMS Vanguard before 
them - the largest, fastest and last of the Royal Navy’s 
battleships - they will be broken up before they have 
ever seen effective service. More practically, someone 
has suggested, they might be converted for use as 
prison ships, as redundant warships were during the 
Napoleonic wars.
The ballistic submarine fleet may survive, and the 
Trident successor may be built. But no one has 
produced a convincing explanation of why we need 
an “independent” deterrent, or against whom it 
would plausibly be directed. The answer seems to be 
at least as much political as military - that is after all 
why the Treasury once agreed to take the costs on the 
central budget, instead of leaving them where they 
belonged, on the defence budget. People argue that 
we need the deterrent because we would otherwise 
lose keep our place on the UN Security Council. That 
is rubbish. We could veto any attempt by the other 
member states to pass a reform of the UN Charter 
that took away our place. Whether in the event we 
would have the political guts to do so is of course 
another matter. The net result is that we will end up 
with a very small navy, consisting of a few large ships 
designed for improbable emergencies, and too few 
of the frigates and other naval workhorses that we 
need to counter real current threats, such as piracy.
At the root of our problem is the continuing desire 
of the British to punch above their weight and our 
feeling that we are, and need to be, still “a power of 
the first rank”. David Cameron says that even after 
the cuts, the British defence budget will still be the 
fourth largest in the world, and that we are the only 
European member of NATO to achieve the defence 
expenditure target of 2% of GDP. He argues, like his 
predecessors, that Britain needs be able to project 
power at a distance. But he does not explain why 
all this is in the national interest, and indeed there 
is no obvious reason why it should be. The truth lies 
elsewhere, and it is rooted in emotion not reason. 
We want aircraft carriers and submarines, and the 
ability to piggyback on any American expedition that 
happens to be going, not because these things are 
essential to our defence, but because they feed our 
historical sense of national greatness: that is the sort 
of power we are, and you’d better know it. It is a 
posture driven by testosterone, not cold analysis. 
But whether we like it or not, we now stand at a 
turning point in British foreign and defence policy 
at least as significant as the failed Suez campaign of 
1956. From Suez the British drew the lesson that they 
could no longer have a wholly independent foreign 
policy, and concluded that to retain a modicum of 
influence in the world they needed to remain very 
close to the Americans. The French drew the same 
lesson, but a different conclusion: that they could 
retain some influence in the world by differing from 
the Americans - within the bounds of prudence.
But even during the Cold War, when our defences 
really did depend on the Americans, our own Prime 
Ministers - Harold Wilson, Edward Heath, Mrs 
Thatcher - were prepared to differ from the Americans 
when they thought the national interest required it. 
The roof did not fall in then, and there is even less 
reason to suppose it will fall in now. Of course the 
Americans like the extra political cover that they get 
from our involvement in their undertakings. Of course 
they value their cooperation with our military and our 
intelligence agencies, even though it is marginal to 
their own capacities. Why should they not? That is 
why Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates intervened - not 
too elegantly - in our domestic fight over the cuts. 
Our willingness to follow the Americans rarely 
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brought us commensurate influence in Washington 
even in the heyday of the “special relationship”. 
Now the relationship is looking increasingly frayed. 
Donald Rumsfeld woundingly but correctly told us 
the Americans could fight the Iraq war perfectly well 
without us. Bob Woodward’s recent book “Obama’s 
Wars” shows that the American government never 
even thought about the British when they were 
considering what to do next in Afghanistan. Our 
“independent” deterrent is entirely vulnerable to 
American decisions about the future of their own 
deterrence technology. It is even worse than that. 
These days, when people in America and Europe talk 
about the “Big Three” who are shaping the future 
of the continent, they mean France, Germany, and 
Italy. They barely mention Britain at all. Far from 
punching above our weight, we are in danger of 
punching below it.
We should draw the right conclusions from all that. 
And indeed, although the new strategic concept 
continues to pay a dutiful lip service to the need to 
go wherever the Americans choose to lead, it also 
talks of cooperation with the other Europeans in 
a surprisingly ungrudging manner. It even speaks, 
apparently sincerely, of collaboration with the French 
- admittedly in the unpromising context of aircraft 
carriers - in the same breath as it talks of cooperation 
with the US Navy. That is something welcome and 
new, though experience shows it will not be at all 
easy to achieve.
It will no doubt take many more years, and more 
painful upheavals, before we finally rid ourselves of 
our crippling nostalgia for past glories. Fortunately 
the government has committed itself to conducting 
further strategic reviews at five yearly intervals, and 
that will provide the opportunity to correct the glaring 
mistakes of this one. Perhaps by the time the first 
review comes round we will already have learned 
a bit of humility, and we will finally redesign our 
defence forces to match both our requirements and 
our means. Sooner or later we will in any case have 
to learn that lesson whether we like it or not. As 
Chaucer’s Dame Prudence said: “I counsel that ye 
begin no war in trust of your riches, for they … suffice 
not wars to maintain.”■
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